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There is considerable disagreement about the effects of informal contacts on 
earnings.  Some researchers report higher earnings for those who found their jobs through 
such contacts, some report lower earnings, and some report no effects.  This paper uses 
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth to address this issue.  When contact 
effects for young male and female workers were measured in the aggregate, those who 
found their jobs through informal contacts fared no better than those using formal 
methods.  However, if subgroup contact effects were measured, those who found their 
jobs through prior-generation male relatives most likely to convey high quality 
information to employers and workers earned at least 13 percent more than those using 
formal and other informal methods.  This means that job network analyses should not 
focus exclusively on the use of informal contacts but should distinguish between contacts 
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I. Introduction 
There is little doubt that friends and relatives play a substantial role in helping 
individuals to find jobs.  Most research indicates that roughly 50 percent of jobs are 
obtained through family, friends, or other acquaintances.  Considerable disagreement, 
however, remains about the effects of informal contacts on earnings.  Some researchers 
report higher earnings gained through contacts, some report lower earnings, and some 
report no effects.   
Many of these studies implicitly assume that the effects of informal contacts are 
uniform and do not distinguish between contacts by gender and age.  Informal contacts 
may, however, provide different quality and amounts of information to workers and 
employers.  In this case, job network analyses should not focus exclusively on the use of 
informal contacts but also on identifying what these contacts can provide for job seekers.   
Similar to previous work, this paper estimates the aggregate effects of informal 
contacts on earnings of young men and women.  It, however, goes on to examine whether 
gender and age differences in effects of family and friends accord with which groups are 
likely to provide better quality and more extensive information.    
 
II.  Literature Review 
Empirical variations in the effects of contacts are not surprising given that the 
correlation between job-finding method and wages on the job actually chosen is the 
outcome of a complex two-part process.  The first part, relational heterogeneity, refers to 
the links between individuals within a job network.  The second part, contact 
heterogeneity, focuses on the characteristics of the individuals themselves.     4
Granovetter (1973, 1995) was among the first to analyze relational heterogeneity.  
He argued that networks with many weak ties between acquaintances tend to generate 
more information about job openings than strong ties between family and close friends.  
This occurs because weak ties provide access to networks unknown to family and close 
friends.   
More recent work analyzes the conditions that affect the efficacy of tie strength.  
Boorman (1975) posits that, even if weak ties have access to more non-redundant 
information, strong ties may be more likely to pass on the information that they do 
possess.  In related work, Burt (1992) contends that, while tie strength is correlated with 
information benefits, links to non-redundant data about available jobs are the more 
proximate source of network breadth.  According to Burt, the key factor is the prevalence 
of structural holes - the separations that bridge the gap between two or more non-
redundant networks.   
Others have focused on additional details of relationship architecture that affect 
productivity.  Consistent with the work just mentioned, Calvo-Armegnol (2003) shows 
that the probability of acquiring a job increases with the number of direct contacts.  He 
also finds, however, that it falls with more indirect contacts because the latter increase the 
competition for available openings.  According to Montgomery (1991), the greater is the 
degree of correlation between worker productivities (inbreeding bias) and the more social 
ties that unemployed individuals have to workers (network density) the greater is the 
competition among firms for referred workers and the higher are their wages relative to 
others.     5
Sources of network heterogeneity such as these may clearly account for part of 
the variation in contact effects.  However, individuals who are part of dense networks 
with many non-redundant ties may still fair poorly in the labor market if their links have 
little valuable information to convey.  Given any system of network ties, the 
characteristics of the network members themselves (i.e. contact heterogeneity) may alter 
the amount and type of information that contacts can potentially provide to job seekers.    
For example, Montgomery (1991) analyzes the implications of employer 
uncertainty about the productivity of prospective new hires.  He shows that, if productive 
traits are correlated across acquaintances, firms will accept referrals only from its current 
high ability workers.  These high ability workers can, therefore, pass along better quality 
information to jobseekers than low ability workers (see also Simon and Warner, 1992 and 
Saloner 1985).  Similarly, Lin’s (2001) “social capital proposition” argues that contacts 
who possess or have access to more highly valued resources improve outcomes for job 
seekers more than other less well-placed contacts.  Empirical evidence of effects of 
contact social status on jobseeker earnings and occupations in the sociological literature 
include Lin, Vaughn, and Ensel (1981) Lin, Ensel, and Vaughn (1981) and Marsden and 
Hurlbert (1988).    
Contact and relational heterogeneity are conceptually distinct respectively as the 
characteristics of nodes in a social structure and the characteristics of the connections 
between the nodes.  However, in practice, their interaction makes separate identification 
difficult.  One reason for the interaction is that networks are endogenous.  Size, density, 
and other components of network architecture may differ depending on the choices made   6
by and, thus, the characteristics of potential members (Calvo-Armengol, 2003 and 
Boorman, 1975).    
In addition, those with higher status may have different relations with jobseekers 
than those with lower status.  Topa (2001) argues that employed social contacts are more 
likely to provide job information to others than unemployed social contacts. They are 
motivated by self-insurance because they would like to receive similar information when 
they themselves become unemployed.  Calvo-Armengo and Jackson (2002) distinguish 
among employed contacts.  They contend that employed workers will pass along 
information only if they cannot use the information themselves to improve their own 
wages.   
While a complete literature review is beyond the scope of this paper (see 
Iaonnides and Loury, 2003 and Marsden, 2001), the research listed here implies that 
some types of contacts may have negligible effects on workers’ wages, while other types 
may generate substantially higher wages for jobseekers.  Relational heterogeneity 
indicates that individuals are likely to earn higher wages through their contacts if the 
latter are located in denser and more extensive networks. Contact heterogeneity points 
out that individuals are more likely to earn more if contacts (1) are employed, (2) receive 
higher wages (3), and/or more substantially reduce the employer’s uncertainty about the 
job seeker’s productivity.  Variation in some or all of these characteristics will generate 
discrepancies in the effects of contacts across different groups.  
Previous empirical work seems to reflect this variation.  Several studies present 
evidence that those who found their jobs their family, friends, and acquaintances earned 
more than those using formal job-search methods (Rosenbaum et al, 1991 and Marmaros   7
and Sacerdote, 2002).  Others showed that the initial wage advantage declined over time 
(Corcoran, Datcher, and Duncan, 1980 and Simon and Warner, 1992).  In contrast, some 
analysts found no general initial or persistent wage effects (Bridges and Willemez, 1986; 
Holzer, 1987; Marsden and Hulbert, 1988; Elliott, 2000).  In fact, some studies (Elliott, 
1999 and Green, Tigges, and Diaz, 1999) showed that those using contacts earned less 
than those using formal methods.    
 
III.  Data and Empirical Results 
This paper estimates the effects of informal contacts on 1982 wages of out-of-
school men and women from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth.    The 
focus in this paper is on younger workers (ages 17 to 24 as of 1982) in order to uncover 
the role of contact and relational heterogeneity
1.  Contemporary contacts of younger 
workers (siblings and friends) are likely to differ from prior-generation contacts of 
younger workers (uncles, aunts, and parents) in those characteristics identified above that 
determine the size of contact effects.   
Informal contact variables for the job held in 1982 were based on responses to the 
questions (1) Was there anyone specifically who helped you get a job with your most 
recent employer, (2) Was this person male or female, (3) Was this person a relative, (4) If 
yes, what was the person’s relationship to you, (5) Was this person working for your 
employer when you were first offered a job, and (6) How did this person help you get the 
job.  
Means and standard deviations of the contact variables used in the analysis are 
listed in Table 1.  Over half of the male sample (54.4 percent) found their jobs through   8
friends and relatives.  Brothers (including in-laws), male cousins, and male friends 
accounted for much of this fraction (33.3 percent).   Prior-generation male relatives 
(fathers, stepfathers, uncles, and fathers-in-law) accounted for another 9.9 percent. 
Contemporary generation (sisters, sisters-in law, and female friends and cousins) and 
prior-generation female contacts (mothers, stepmothers and mothers-in-law) constituted  
considerably smaller portions (7.0 percent and 2.9 percent respectively).   
Consistent with other research (Corcoran, Datcher, and Duncan 1980), women 
were, at 47.5 percent, less likely to use friends and relatives to find jobs men.  In addition, 
contemporary generation female friends and relatives made up a larger fraction of this 
group (24.0 percent) than did both contemporary generation male friends and relatives 
and prior generation male relatives at 11.6 and 2.8 percent respectively (see also Beggs 
and Hurlbert, 1997).      
Table 2 presents the empirical results of contact effects on wages.  Columns 1 and 
2 imply that young men and women who found their jobs through family or friends do 
not, in the aggregate, appear to earn significantly more than those who found their jobs 
through formal channels
2.  The largest of the four coefficients (0.016) is both small and 
insignificant.     
The findings in columns 3 and 4 show that this result does not hold, however, for 
all types of informal contacts.  In column 3, men who found their jobs through prior-
generation male relatives who knew the boss or arranged an interview earned almost 14 
percent more than those using formal or other informal methods
3.  Since the coefficient 
of heard about the job from a prior- generation male relative is virtually zero (0.0022), it 
appears that merely having more contacts is not sufficient to raise wages of young men.   9
Those contacts must be able to intercede, in some way, of the worker’s behalf with the 
employer.  Furthermore, such intervention is not uniformly effective since similar 
referrals from contemporary generation male relatives and friends had no large or 
significant effect on wages [0.0185 (0.0291)].     
The most obvious explanation of these findings is contact heterogeneity. Prior-
generation male relatives have access to more and better information about job openings.  
In addition, employers may place greater weight on recommendations by more senior 
workers.  An alternative explanation based on relational heterogeneity would argue that, 
given the same information about high-paying jobs, prior-generation male relatives are 
more likely to act on behalf of and pass on information to jobseekers rather than use it 
themselves.   
Auxiliary Current Population Survey data in Table 3 indicates that the findings in 
Table 2 are consistent with the previous discussion of contact and relational 
heterogeneity.  The data shows that, compared to younger men and all women, older men 
are much more likely to have the contact characteristics identified earlier that result in 
higher wages for jobseekers.  In particular, median income, employment rates, job tenure, 
and percent of full-time workers were substantially higher for men ages 45-54 than for 
the other groups. 
Similar differences in the characteristics of contacts can also explain some of the 
mixed findings about the effects of job contacts on wages in previous research. 
Rosenblum et al (1999) reported that the effect of job contacts through relatives increased 
as men aged from 19 to 28.  That is, contacts had more impact as male cousins, brothers-
in-law, and brothers moved from characteristics similar to those of the contemporary   10
generation towards characteristics similar to those of the prior generation (higher 
earnings, longer job tenure, lower unemployment).  Mencken and Winfield (2000), Smith 
(2000), and Beggs and Hurlbert (1997) reported that women who used male contacts 
found employment in higher-paying occupations.  Similarly, contact effects were larger 
for white, inner-city young males (whose contacts had higher earnings and employment 
rates) than for their African-American counterparts (Korenman and Turner, 1996).   
Some of the studies that report positive correlation between earnings and informal 
contacts used samples likely to associate with wage-enhancing contacts.  These include 
Marmaros and Sacerdote (2002) who analyzed the effects of job networks for Dartmouth 
College seniors and Simon and Warner (1992) who examined data from the 1972 Survey 
of Natural and Social Scientists and Engineers.  In contrast, Holzer (1987) reported no 
wage effects using a sample (men ages 16-23) less likely to associate with wage-
enhancing contacts.   
The negative effect of contemporary female contacts on male wages reported in 
column 3 of Table 2 initially seems surprising given the theoretical support for positive 
effects of contacts on reservation wages.  The combination of contact and relational 
heterogeneity is the key to this puzzle.   Previously mentioned research work (Mencken 
and Winfield, 2000; Smith, 2000; and Beggs and Hurlbert, 1997) which reports that 
women who used female contacts found employment in lower-paying occupations 
implies that women are likely to be poor contacts for male job seekers.  This, in turn, 
suggests that men accepting jobs referred by contemporary females would, on average, 
have few alternatives and would be less selective about job choices.      11
This interpretation is consistent with Loury’s (2003) finding that young men who 
accepted jobs referred by contemporary generation female friends and relatives 
experienced more sluggish subsequent job mobility than those who accepted jobs 
available through formal and other informal channels.  A similar explanation may also 
account for the Green et al (1999) finding that Hispanics who used informal contacts 
earned less than those using other methods.  In related work, Elliott (1999) reported that, 
for urban workers, non-white contacts reduced earnings especially when the contact was 
a neighbor.  He concluded that “at the bottom of today’s urban labor markets, the use of 
personal contacts serves as a strategy of last resort, rather than as a means of leveraging 
oneself into better jobs.”  
Column 4 of Table 2 shows that women who found their jobs through prior-
generation male relatives earned significantly more than those using other informal or 
formal methods.  It is not possible to distinguish between prior-generation male relatives 
given the relatively small number of women using this option.   However, the size of the 
effect for women  [0.160 (0.064)] is roughly comparable to that for men [0.138 (0.058)] 
with older male relatives who knew the boss or arranged an interview.   
Selection bias does not appear to account for the positive correlation between 
wages and the job contacts for young men and women.  The large and significant 
coefficients of 1980 Air Force Qualifying Test (AFQT) in Table 2 imply that such scores 
capture some of the otherwise unobserved, productive characteristics that affect wages.  
Related work (e.g. Neal and Johnson, 1996) argues that, while AFQT scores do not 
embody all unobserved determinants of wages, they play a relatively important role in 
explaining earnings variation between and within groups.  The coefficients for employer-  12
connected prior male generation job contacts when AFQT scores are included [0.139  
(0.058)] and when AFQT scores are left out [0.131 (0.058)] were virtually identical.  This 
suggests that the reported estimates are not merely the result of contacts referring highly 
productive workers who would have earned more even in the absence of informal 
information. 
  
IV.  Conclusion 
The findings in this paper show that empirical estimates of effects of informal 
contacts that do not distinguish between contact types may generate misleading 
conclusions.  When contact effects for young male and female workers were measured in 
the aggregate, those who find their jobs through informal contacts fared no better than 
those using formal methods.  However, if subgroup contact effects were measured, those 
who found their jobs through prior-generation males most likely to convey information to 
employers earned at least 13 percent more than those using formal and other informal 
methods.  These findings suggest that the effect of contacts on wages may differ over the 
life cycle and, more generally, may vary with contact and relational characteristics.  
Discrepancies between past empirical estimates of job contact effects appear to reflect 
such differences.     13
Footnotes 
 
1 The original 1979 sample was 12686.  Overall, 6519 individuals were excluded 
from this analysis.  Some individuals (3617) were excluded because they were still in 
school.  Others (2902) were excluded due to missing or invalid 1982 data.  These 
included 603 for years of schooling, 2233 for earnings, and 66 for tenure at job.  This 
analysis includes weights to control for attrition and nonrandom sampling used to 
produce the NLSY data. 
2 Using similar NLSY data for men, Korenman and Turner (1996) found larger 
and significant wage effects for contacts.  Their sample included only urban men. 
Furthermore, unlike Korenman and Turner (1996), this analysis does not include 
occupation. Occupation was not included here since part of the reason for higher wages 
in referred jobs may be access to higher-paying occupations.   
3 The fraction of men finding their jobs through a prior generation male contact 
who knew the employer or who arranged an interview was 0.04.  The fraction of men 
finding their jobs through a contemporaneous generation male contact who knew the 
employer or who arranged an interview was 0.13. 
 
   14
References 
 
Beggs, John and Jeanne Hurlbert. 1997. "The Social Context of Men's and Women's Job 
Search Ties: Membership in Voluntary Organizations, Social Resources, and Job 
Search Outcomes." Sociological Perspectives 40 (4): 601-622. 
Boorman, Scott A. 1975. “A Combinatorial Optimization Model for Transmission of Job 
Information through Contact Networks.”’ Bell Journal of Economics and 
Management Science 6 (1): 216- 249. 
Bridges, William and Wayne Villemez. 1986. “Informal Hiring and Income in the Labor 
Market." American Sociological Review 51 (4): 574-582. 
Burt, Ronald S. 1992. Structural Holes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Calvo-Armegnol, Antoni.  2003. “Job Contact Networks.” Department of Economics, 
Universidad Carlos III, April, working paper. 
Calvo-Armegnol, Antoni and Matthew O. Jackson.  2002. “Social Norms and Resulting 
Patterns in Dynamics of Employment and Wages.” California Institute of 
Technology Working Paper. 
Corcoran, Mary, Linda Datcher, and Greg Duncan.  1980. “Information and Influence 
Networks in Labor Markets,'' 1-37, in Duncan, Greg J., and James N. Morgan, 
eds., Five Thousand American Families, Vol. VIII, Institute for Social Research, 
University of Michigan. 
Elliott, James. 1999. "Social Isolation and Labor Market Isolation: Network and 
Neighborhood Effects on Less-Educated UrbanWorkers." Sociological Quarterly 
40 (2): 199-216.   15
Elliott, James. 2000. “Class, Race, and Job Matching in Contemporary Urban  Labor 
Markets.” Social Science Quarterly. 81 ( 4):. 1036-1052. 
Granovetter, Mark. 1973. “The Strength of Weak Ties." American Journal of Sociology 
78 (6): 1360-1380. 
Granovetter, Mark S. 1995. Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers, Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
Green, Gary, Leann Tiggs, and Daniel Diaz. 1999. “Racial and Ethnic Differences in Job 
Search Strategies in Atlanta, Boston, and Los Angeles.” Social Science Quarterly 
80 (2): 559-577. 
Holzer, Harry.  1987.  “Job Search by Employed and Unemployed Youth.” Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 40 (4): 601-611. 
Ioannides,Yannis M. and Linda Datcher Loury. 2003.  “Job Information Networks, 
Neighborhood Effects And Inequality”. Discussion Paper, Tufts University. 
Korenmann, Sanders and Susan Turner. 1996. “Employment Contacts and Minority-
White Wage Differences.” Industrial Relations 35 (1): 106-122. 
Lin, Nan. 2001. Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action. Cambridge and 
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Lin, Nan, Walter Ensel, and John Vaughn. 1981. “Social Resources and Strength of Ties: 
Structural Factors in Occupational Status Attainment.” American Sociological 
Review. 46 (4): 393-405. 
Lin, Nan; John Vaughn, and Walter Ensel. 1981. “Social Resources and Occupational 
Status Attainment.” Social Forces 59 (4): 1163-1181.   16
Loury, Linda. 2003. “Job Tenure and Personal Contacts: Good Matches or Limited 
Choices.”  Tufts University Economics Department Working Paper. 
Marmaros, David, and Bruce Sacerdote. 2002. “Peer and Social Networks in Job Search.” 
European Economic Review  46 (4-5): 870-879. 
Marsden, Peter and Elizabeth Gorman. 2001. “Social Network, Job Changes, and 
Recruitment.” In Sourcebook of Labor Markets: Evolving Structures and 
Processes edited by Ivar Berg and Arne Kalleberg, New York: Plenum 
Publishers. 
Marsden, Peter and Jeanne Hurlbert. 1988. “Social Resources and Mobility Outcomes: A 
Replication and Extension." Social Forces 66 (4): 1038-1059. 
Mencken, F. Carson and IdeeWinfield. 2000. "Job Search and Sex Segregation: Does Sex 
of Social Contact Matter?" Sex Roles 42 (9-10): 847-864. 
Montgomery, James D. 1991.  “Social Networks and Labor Market Outcomes: Towards 
an Economic Analysis.”’ American Economic Review 81 (5): 1408-1418. 
Neal, Derek and William Johnson. 1996.  “The Role of Pre-market Factors in Black-
White Wage Differences.” Journal of Political Economy 104 (5): 869-895. 
Rosenbaum, James, Stefanie DeLuca, Shazla Miller, and Kevin Roy. 1999. "Pathways 
into Work: Short- and Long-term Effects of Personal and Institutional Ties." 
Sociology of Education 72 (3): 179-196. 
Saloner, Garth. 1985. “Old Boy Networks as Screening Mechanisms.” Journal of Labor 
Economics, 3 (3): 255-267.   17
Simon, Curtis and John Warner. 1992.   “Matchmaker, Matchmaker: The Effect of Old 
Boy Networks on Job Match Quality, Earnings, and Tenure." Journal of Labor 
Economics 10 (3): 306-330. 
Smith, Sandra.  2000. “Mobilizing Social Resources: Race, Ethnic, and Gender 
Differences in Social Capital and Persisting Wage Inequalities," Sociological 
Quarterly  41 (4): 509-537. 
Topa, Georgio.  2001. “Social Interactions, Local Spillovers and Unemployment”, 
Review of Economic Studies 68 (2): 261-295. 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1985. Current Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 146, 
Money Income of Household, Families, and Persons in the United States: 1983, 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.  
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1984.  Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1985, 
Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.  




   18
Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations (in parentheses) of Selected Variables 
Contact  Variables   Men   Women 
      
Had help to find job with present        
employer from friends and    0.5437    0.4754 
family,  total   (0.4981)   (0.4995) 
      
   Father (including in-law and     0.0986   0.0283 
   step), grandfather, or uncle    (0.2982)   (0.1658) 
        
   Mother (including in-law and     0.0287      0.0682 
   step), grandmother, or aunt    (0.1671)   (0.2522) 
      
   Sisters, female cousins, or    0.0699   0.2401 
   female friends    (0.2550)   (0.0379) 
      
   Brothers, male cousins, or     0.3325   0.1163 
   male friends    (0.4712)   (0.3206) 
      
   Other relatives    0.0139    0.0225 
   (0.1171)   (0.1483) 
      
Number of observations    3235    2932   19
Table 2. Estimated Effects of Selected Variables on ln 1982 Wages  
 
Explanatory  Variables  Men   Women    Men   Women 
      
Years of schooling   0.0651   0.0462 0.0651    0.0465
 (0.0096)   (0.0092) (0.0095)    (0.0092)
         
Potential work experience   0.0432   0.0189 0.0430    0.0194
 (Age – years of schooling)  (0.0068)   (0.0064) (0.0067)    (0.0063)
         
Job tenure at current job  0.0009   0.0017 0.0009    0.0017
 (in weeks)  (0.0002)   (0.0002) (0.0002)    (0.0002)
         
Whether black  -0.0912   -0.0304 -0.0877    -0.0273
(0-1 dummy variable)  (0.0257)   (0.0276) (0.0256)    (0.0275)
         
Had help to find job with present               
employer from:  (0-1 dummy                
      v a r i a b l e s )          
      
   Friends  0.0130   -0.0037    
 (0.0242)   (0.0249)    
      
   Relatives  0.0162   -0.0021    
 (0.0303)   (0.0296)    
      
   Father (including in-law and     0.0022    0.1601
   step), grandfather, or uncle    (0.0555)    (0.0639)
           
   Mother (including in-law and     -0.0378    0.0018
   step), grandmother, or aunt    (0.0491)    (0.0380)
         
   Sisters, female cousins, or    -0.0832    -0.0177
   female friends    (0.0379)    (0.0261)
         
   Brothers, male cousins, or     0.0221    0.0393
   male friends    (0.0287)    (0.0355)
         
   Had help from father,       0.1386     
   grandfather, or uncle who knew       (0.0581)     
   the boss or arranged an                 
   interview           
          
  Had help from brother, male       0.0185     
  cousin or male friend who knew       (0.0291)     
  the boss or arranged            
  an interview            
      
AFQT score   0.0016   0.0028 0.0016    0.0028
 (Percentile rank)  (0.0005)   (0.0005) (0.0005)   (0.0005)
          
          
R
2 0.1779 0.1531 0.1885    0.1572
 
Also included in the analysis was a constant term and dummy variables for don’t know AFQT score and 
whether married.  20
Table 3. Income and Employment Characteristics by Sex and Age 
 
   Men Men   Women  Women  
Characteristics   20-24 45-54   20-24  45-54  
         
Median income    7651 23347   5692  8205  
         
Employment to    64.9 85.5   60.9  58.2  
    population  ratio         
         
         
Year-round, full-time    38.4 75.4   36.9  59.8  
  workers,  percent         
         
         
Median years of     1.5 12.8   1.5  6.3  
  tenure  with  current         
 employer, 1983         
        
 
Sources:  U.S. Bureau of the Census (1985),  Current Population Reports, Series P-60, 
No. 246, Money Income of Household, Families, and Persons in the United States: 1983, 
Table 46. U.S. Bureau of the Census (1984), Statistical Abstract of the United States: 
1985, Table 658. www.bls.census.gov/cps/pub/tenure_0296.htm (1997) Employee Tenure 
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